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Abstract
We estimate a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model for the US and 
the euro area including relevant housing market features and examine the monetary policy 
implications of housing-related disturbances. In particular, we derive the optimal monetary 
policy cooperation consistent with the structural specification of the model. Our estimation 
results reinforce the existing evidence on the role of housing and mortgage markets for the 
US and provide new evidence on the importance of the collateral channel in the euro area. 
Moreover, we document the various implications of credit frictions for the propagation of 
macroeconomic disturbances and the conduct of monetary policy. We find that allowing for 
some degree of monetary policy response to fluctuations in the price of residential goods 
improves the empirical fit of the model and is consistent with the main features of optimal 
monetary policy response to housing-related shocks.
Keywords: Housing, credit frictions, optimal monetary policy, new open economy macro- 
economics, Bayesian estimation 
JEL Classification: E4, E5, F4 5
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Non-Technical Summary
The macroeconomic literature has recently shown a particular interest in understanding the role played
by credit market frictions faced by households in determining business cycle dynamics and monetary
policy conduct. A common featureacross the existing theoretical frameworks is the inﬂuence of housing
collateral on households consumption decisions.
In this paper, we aim at analyzing the importance of housing markets and household credit frictions on
monetary policy setting within an open-economy framework. Our contribution intends to bridge a gap
between the growing strand of literature focusing on credit frictions in closed economies characterized
by the presence of nominal rigidities and the existing estimated New Open Economy Macroeconomics
models. We estimate a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model for the US and the
euro area including relevant housing market features and examine the monetary policy implications of
housing-relateddisturbances. In orderto putinto perspectivethe monetary policy response to economic
disturbances originating in the housing sector, we also derive the optimal monetary policy cooperation
consistent with the structural speciﬁcation of the model.
The original contribution of the paper covers several dimensions. First, our results reinforce the existing
evidence on the role of housing and mortgage markets for the US and provide new evidence on the
importance of the collateral channel in the euro area. Second, we ﬁnd that structural housing-related
shocks have signiﬁcant spillovers to non-residential consumption through the collateral channel and
therefore the share of borrowers in the economy. In terms of international spillovers, the transmission
of housing preference shocks on economic activity is assessed to be relatively limited and lower than in
the case of demand shocks affecting the tradable sector. Third, housing shocks play a key role in gen-
erating negative comovement across countries for both real housing prices and residential investment.
Finally, it turns out that allowing for a direct monetary policy response to house prices in the interest
rate feedback rule improves the empirical ﬁt of the model. From a normative perspective, some degree
of monetary policy reaction to ﬂuctuations in the price of residential goods is consistent with the main
features of optimal monetary policy response to housing-related shocks. The augmented Taylor rule
estimation turns out to be welfare-improving compared with the benchmark case, in particular for the
US economy.6
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1 Introduction
This paper aims at analyzing the importance of housing markets and household credit frictions on mon-
etary policy conduct within an open-economy framework. In doing so, our contribution intends to
bridge a gap between the growing strand of literature focusing on credit frictions in closed economies
characterized by the presence of nominal rigidities1, and the existing estimated New Open Economy
Macroeconomics models 2. We estimate a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model
for the US and the euro area including relevant housing market features and examine the monetary pol-
icy implications of housing-related disturbances.
The macroeconomic literature has recently shown a particular interest in understanding the role played
by credit market frictions faced by households in determining business cycle dynamics. More speciﬁ-
cally, the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of such frictions has attracted a special attention.
A common feature across the existing theoretical frameworks is the inﬂuence of housing collateral on
households consumption decisions. The empirical evidence suggests the existence of a fraction of con-
sumers in the economy who face binding collateral constraints when approaching loans and mortgage
markets. As a result, institutional arrangements in such markets, as well as different housing market
structures can potentially affect households’ home-purchasing and consumption decisions in a signiﬁ-
cant way. Most of the existing literature has been focusing on a closed-economy setup, thus abstracting
from international factors and cross-country spillovers3.
In modeling the closed economy setup, we follow a recent strand of literature which - like Kiyotaki and
Moore [1997] - considers a dual structure on the household side, with agents belonging to two different
groups according to their intertemporal discount factor. Households’ heterogeneity generates equilib-
rium debt as the result of intertemporal borrowing between more and less impatient agents. Building
on Iacoviello and Neri [2007]and Notarpietro [2007], we deﬁne a two-agent, two-sector economy for
each country, where the impatient agents face collateral requirements when asking for mortgages or
loans. Firms produce nondurable consumption goods (which can be traded internationally) and resi-
dential goods (which are considered non-tradable). The latter serve two purposes: they can be directly
consumed, thus providing utility services as any durable good, or they can be used as collateral in the
credit market, to obtain extra funds for ﬁnancing consumption. The role of collateral constraints in
closed economies has been estimated in DSGE models by Iacoviello and Neri [2007]a n dNotarpietro
[2007],who report the relevance of housing market shocks in shaping consumption dynamics in the US.
We focus here on the role of housing market factors and credit frictions in explaining both closed and
open-economy ﬂuctuations. In particular,we estimate structural parameterssuch as the relativeshareof
borrowers in the two economies, and we show how they affect the transmission mechanism of housing
market and monetary policy shocks both domestically and internationally.
The use of an explicit two-country setup allows for estimating and testing for the existence of structural
1See Iacoviello [2005], Iacoviello and Neri [2007], Monacelli [2006], and Notarpietro [2007] among others.
2See Adjemian et al. [2008], Adolfson et al. [2005],De Walque et al. [2005], and Rabanal and Tuesta [2006]
3An exception is Christensen et al. [2007], who estimate a small open economy model for Canada.7
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differences across the two continental economies. On the open-economy side, we introduce most of the
common featuresof estimated open-economy DSGE models, following closely Adjemian etal. [2008]. In
particular, we assume that ﬁnancial markets are incomplete internationally. However, we do not allow
for international tradeof private debt, so that the borrowers can only access domestic credit markets; the
savers can instead trade two nominal risk-less bonds denominated in the domestic and foreign currency
respectively. The model is estimated on US and euro area quarterly data, over the period 1981 I: 2005 IV,
by making use of full-information Bayesian techniques.
Moreover, in order to put into perspective the monetary policy response to economic disturbances orig-
inating in the housing sector, we derive the optimal monetary policy cooperation consistent with the
structural speciﬁcation of the model. As in Adjemian et al. [2008], the Ramsey approach to optimal
monetary policy cooperation is computed by formulating an inﬁnite-horizon Lagrangian problem of
maximizing the conditional aggregate welfare of both countries subject to the full set of non-linear con-
straints forming the competitive equilibrium of the model. We solve the equilibrium conditions of the
optimal allocation using second-order approximations to the policy function. In this paper, we restrict
ouranalysis to theassessment of theoptimal policy toleranceforrelativehouse priceﬂuctuations. We do
not intend to explore systematically all the factors which shape optimal policy in our modeling frame-
work. Such an exercise would go beyond the scope of the present contribution and is left for further
research. Instead, we consider the optimal monetary policy response to housing-related shocks which,
under standard Taylor rules, generate strong relative house price changes and ample asymmetry be-
tween savers’ and borrowers’ reactions.
The main contributions of the paper cover several dimensions. First, our results reinforce the existing
evidence on the role of housing and mortgage markets for the US and provide new evidence on the
importance of the collateral channel in the euro area. In particular, we estimate different versions of
the model, considering high or low shares of borrowers in the economy. Our results suggest notably
that the share of impatient households is higher in the US than in the euro area. We also ﬁnd that the
estimated shares of borrowers are quite sensitive to the speciﬁcation of ap r i o r idistributions, which ulti-
mately should be set based on appropriate economic grounds.
Second, in terms of economic propagation of non-housing related shocks, the presence of credit frictions
alters signiﬁcantly the relative responses of aggregate consumption and non-residential investment.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that structural housing-related shocks have signiﬁcant spillovers on non-residential
consumption through the collateral channel and the share of borrowers in the economy. Nonetheless,
the residential sector is somewhat unaffectedby shifts in the share of borrowers due to its dual nature of
ﬂexible-price, non-traded goods producing sector. In terms of international spillovers, the transmission
of housing preference shocks on economic activity is found to be relatively limited and lower than in
the case of demand shocks affecting the tradable sector. Finally, housing shocks play a key role in gen-
erating negative comovement across countries for both real housing prices and residential investment.
Third, we ﬁnd that allowing for a monetary policy response to house prices improves the empirical ﬁt
of the model, and paves the way for a deeper analysis of optimal monetary policy cooperation in the8
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proposed framework4. From a normative perspective, some degree of monetary policy reaction to ﬂuc-
tuations in the price of residential goods is consistent with the main features of optimal monetary policy
response to housing-related shocks. Based on welfare computations when only housing shocks are al-
lowed, the estimated Taylor rule augmented with real housing prices turns out to be welfare-improving
compared with the benchmark case, in particular for the US economy. Beyond this, the optimal allo-
cation suggests that the heterogenous responses across households and the associated welfare losses in
terms of imperfect risk sharing should be counteracted, even at the cost of short term inﬂation volatility.
Compared with the estimated rules, our results indicate noticeably that the optimal international trans-
mission of positive housing-related shocks leads to a more pronounced monetary policy tightening in
the foreign country and to a negative adjustment of housing prices and quantities as well as domestic
demand for non-residential goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main decision problems of the
structural model. Section 3 presents the results of the Bayesian estimation. Section 4 explores the inter-
national propagation of shocks in the estimated model. In section 5 we investigate the monetary policy
response to housing shocks, both from an historical perspective - by estimating Taylor rules augmented
with real housing prices - and through an analysis of the optimal allocation.
2 Theoretical model
The world economy is constituted by two symmetric countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). Each coun-
try is modeled as a two-agent, two-sector economy, producing residential and non residential goods5.
Non-residential ﬁnal goods are produced by a continuum of “single-good-ﬁrms” indexed on [0,1],m i x -
ing local production with imports. More precisely, in each country ﬁnal producers for local sales and
inputs operate in perfect competition and aggregate a continuum of differentiated products purchased
from Home and Foreign intermediate-sector ﬁrms. The latter are monopolistic competitors and exert
some market power through the setting of prices. The residential-goods sector has a similar structure,
but ﬁnal and intermediate goods are not traded.
We assume that in each country there exists a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households, the number of
which is proportional to the number of ﬁrms. Following the seminal contribution of Kiyotaki and Moore
[1997],we consider two types of households in each country, differingin their relativeintertemporal dis-
count factor. More precisely, a fraction (1 − ω) of households in country H (and, symmetrically, (1 − ω∗)
in F) are relatively more patient, and the remaining ω (resp. ω∗) are impatient. Households receive
utility from consuming both nonresidential and residential goods, and disutility from labor. Residential
goods are treated here as durable goods, and serve two purposes: they can be either directly consumed
or used as collateral in the mortgage market. Private debt is generated in equilibrium, as the result of
intertemporal trade among the patient agents (who act as lenders, or savers), and the impatient agents
(who act as net borrowers). The existence of frictions in household credit markets is captured by impos-
4 We use the expressions "house price" and "price of residential goods" as synonymous in the text.
5We follow closely Iacoviello and Neri [2007]a n dNotarpietro [2007] in deﬁning the closed-economy setup for each country.9
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ing a perpetually binding collateral constraint on the entire group of impatient agents6.
We present the structure of the model and some derivations for country H only, for the sake of brevity.
Analogous derivations hold true for country F.
2.1 The borrower’s program
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with the parameter hB capturing habit formation in consumption of non-residential goods. We intro-
duce three stochastic terms in the utility function: a preference shock ε
β
t , a labor supply shock εL
t (com-
mon acrosssectors) anda housing preferenceshock, εD
t . The latter affectsthe relativeshareof residential
stock, ωD, and modiﬁes the marginal rate of substitution between non-residential and residential goods
consumption. All the shocks are assumed to follow stationary AR(1) processes.
Households receive disutility from labor in each sector, Lb
C,t and Lb
D,t. The speciﬁcation of labor supply
assumes that households have preferences over providing labor services across different sectors. In par-
ticular, the speciﬁc functional form adopted implies that hours worked are perfectly substitutable across
sectors. LC and LD are level-shift terms needed to ensure that the impatient’s labor supply is equal to 1
in steady state.
Impatient agents in each country can trade a nominal risk-less bond denominated in the domestic cur-
rency, but they cannot tap the international ﬁnancial markets to ﬁnance their expenditure plans. In
addition, they do not save nor accumulate capital. Total savings and investment decisions in each coun-
try are implemented by the savers, as we show later.
Under these assumptions, each borrower maximizes her utility function (1) subject to an inﬁnite se-
































6As a consequence, we will use the terms impatient (patient) and borrower (saver) as interchangeable throughout, with a slight
abuse of terminology.
7We use the non-residential goods price level as a deﬂator.10
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where δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate and TD,t ≡
PD,t
P t is the relative price of residential goods in terms
of non-residential goods,   Bb
H,t is the stock of nominal debt issued by the borrower at time t, Rt−1 is
the nominal interest rate paid on the existing amount of debt   Bb
H,t−1 and πt is the gross non-residential
good inﬂation rate. W b
C,t and Wb
D,t denote the borrower’s nominal wages in the two sectors.   TT
b
t are
government transfers and τw,t is a time-varying labor tax. Finally,   Ab
t is a stream of income coming from
state-contingent securities, allowing the borrowers to hedge against wage income risk. Given separa-
bility of preferences, trading such assets ensures that all borrowers have identical consumption plans.
Therefore, we can drop the superscript b and simply use a to denote variables related to the borrowers.
We also introduce a consumption tax which affects the price of the distributed goods serving ﬁnal con-
sumption. The after-tax consumer price index (CPI) is denoted Pt =( 1+τC,t)P t where P t is the price
of the distribution good gross of consumption tax. Such a time-varying consumption tax could in prin-





At each period in time, all the borrowers have limited access to credit markets, as summarized by the
following (nominal) collateral constraint:
  BH,t ≤ εLTV
t (1 − χ)Et
 




where χ ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of the residential good that cannot be used as a collateral. Such a param-
eter is an indirect measure of the ﬂexibility of the mortgage market. The term (1 − χ) thus provides a
proxy for the observed loan-to-value ratio, which is subject to a stationary stochastic shock εLTV
t .T h e
collateral constraint can be conveniently rewritten in real terms as follows:
  bH,t ≤ εLTV
t (1 − χ)Et
 






where  bH,t ≡ BH
P t .
Summing up, the impatient agent maximizes (1) subject to the inﬁnite sequence of (3)a n d( 4)h o l d i n g
with equality8. We report the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem in the Appendix.
2.2 The saver’s program
The patient agents, s ∈ [ω,1], are characterized by a higher intertemporal discount factor than the bor-
rowers, and thus act as net lenders in equilibrium. They own the productive capacities and make de-
cisions on investment plans to build the capital stock which will be rented out to intermediate ﬁrms.
The savers can trade two nominal risk-less bonds denominated in the domestic and foreign currency.
Financial markets are assumed to be incomplete internationally. We introduce a risk premium on the
international ﬁnancing of domestic consumption expenditures. Such risk premium is a function of real
8It is possible to show that the collateral constraint always binds in the deterministic steady state, under general conditions.
We assume here that it continues to bind in a sufﬁciently small neighborhood of the steady state, so that the model can be solved
by taking a ﬁrst order approximation.11
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holdings of foreign assets in the entire economy. Each patient agent receives instantaneous utility from










































































































































where St is the nominal exchange rate, TTs
t are government transfers and Πs
t are distributed proﬁts.
















represents the sector-speciﬁc nominal return on the real capital stock minus the cost associated with
variations in the degree of capital utilization10. Savers have access to international bond trading: Bs
H,t
and Bs
F,t are individual holdings of domestic and foreign bonds denominated in local currency The
risk premium function Ψ(·,·) is differentiable, decreasing in both arguments and veriﬁes Ψ(0,0) = 1.
The functional form used for the risk premium is Ψ(X,Y )=e x p ( −χΔSX − 2χY ).T h et e r mεΔS
t is a
unitary-mean disturbance affecting the risk premium.
As for the borrowers, we maintain the assumption that state-contingent assets are traded among the
savers, in order to hedge against wage income. The corresponding stream of income is denoted As
t.A sa
result, all savers have identical consumption plans in equilibrium. Therefore, we can drop superscripts






The optimality conditions characterizing the solution of the saver’s problem are reported in the Ap-
pendix.
9Variables related to the saver are denoted with a superscript s, as opposed to b, used for the borrowers.
10Following Smets and Wouters [2007], we assume that the income obtained from renting out capital services depends on the
level of capital augmented for its utilization rate. Moreover, the cost of capacity utilization is zero when capacity is fully used
(Φ(1) = 0). The functional form for the adjustment costs on capacity utilization is Φ(X)=Rk
ϕ (exp[ϕ(X − 1)] − 1).12
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I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w em a k eu s eo ft h es a v e r ’ sa n db o r r o w e r ’ suser costs of residential investment (the
exact deﬁnition can also be found in the Appendix). The user cost indicators are driving the substitu-
tion effects between durable and non-durable goods for each household type. The aggregate user cost,
denoted R
aggregate
D , is deﬁned as the weighted average of the saver’s and borrower’s user costs.
2.3 Labor supply and wage setting
In both countries, households provide differentiated labor services. We assume that the fractions of
patient and impatient agents are uniformly distributed across the range of labor services. As a conse-
quence, on aggregate the total supply of a given labor service is identical across types. In each sector j
(j = C,D) a continuum of unions operate as monopolistic suppliers of the differentiated labor services.
Every union represents workers of a certain type. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that unions sell
their continuum of labor services (over the interval [0,1]) to a perfectly competitive ﬁrm, which in turns










where μw = θw
θw−1 and θw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor services.










t,w h e r eW
j
t =





is the aggregate wage rate.
Unions set wages on a staggered basis. Every period, each union faces a constant probability 1 − αj
w of
being able to adjust its nominal wage. If the union is not allowed to re-optimize, wages are indexed to
past and steady-state inﬂation according to the following rule:








where Πt = Pt
Pt−1 and ξj
w denotes the degree of indexation in each sector. Taking into account that
unions might not be able to choose their nominal wage optimally in the future, the optimal nominal
wage   Wj,t(z) is chosen to maximize the weighted average across households types of intertemporal
utility under the budget constraint and the labor demand function.
The Appendix reports the ﬁrst order conditions for this program written in a recursive form, and an
expression for the aggregate wage dynamics.
2.4 Investment decisions
The patient agents in each country own capital and rent it out to the intermediate goods-ﬁrms at the
sector-speciﬁc rental rate R
k,j
t (j = C,D). Investment is constituted by the distributed non-residential
good only. The savers choose the investment and capacity utilization in each sector to maximize their
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where δK ∈ [0,1] is the depreciation rate of capital, S is a non-negative adjustment cost function for-





t is an efﬁciency shock to
the technology of capital accumulation, common to both sectors. The functional forms adopted are
S (x)=φ/2( x − 1)
2 for country H and S (x)=φ∗/2( x − 1)
2 for country F,w i t hφ and φ∗ constant.
2.5 Distribution sector for non-residential goods
Non-residentialgoods in each country areproducedby a continuum of companies that, operating under
perfect competition, mix local production with imports. There is a home bias in aggregation, n,w h i c h





































in the foreign country, with ξ denoting the elasticity of substitution between bundles YH and YF.T h e
degrees of home bias are subject to shocks. As only the difference of openness rates enters the lin-
earized aggregate equations in the absence of adjustment costs on imports, home bias shocks are given








Cost minimization determines import demands:
YH,t = nt (TH,t)




















































H,t denote the interior terms of trade. We also make use of the relative
prices TH,t =
PH,t







2.6 Final non-residential goods sector
In country H, ﬁnal producers for local sales and imports are in perfect competition and aggregate a
continuum of differentiated intermediate products from home and foreign intermediate sector. YH and
YF are sub-indexes of the continuum of differentiated goods produced respectively in country H and
F. The elementary differentiated goods are imperfect substitutes with an elasticity of substitution de-
noted
μ
μ−1. Final goods are produced with the following technology YH =
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. In the country F, the corresponding indexes are given by Y ∗
F =













. For a domestic product h,w ed e n o t ep(h) its price on local market and p∗(h) its
price on the foreign import market. The domestic-demand-based price indexes associated with imports
andlocal marketsin both countries aredeﬁnedasPH =


























. Domestic demand is allocated across the dif-








































2.7 Intermediate non-residential ﬁrms
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistic competitors and produce differentiated products using


















t (f)1−αC − Ω∗
C ∀f ∈ [0,1]
where εA
t and εA∗
t are exogenous technology parameters. Each ﬁrm sells its products both in the local
and in the foreign market. We denote YH(h) and Y ∗
H(h) (respectively Y ∗
F(f) and YF(f)) the local and




F (f) and LC
F(f)) the corresponding labor demand.
Local ﬁrms set prices on a staggered basis àl aCalvo [1983]. In each period, a ﬁrm h (resp. f)f a c e sa
constant probability 1 − αH (resp. 1 − α∗
F) of being able to re-optimize its nominal price. The average
duration of a rigidity period is then 1
1−αH (resp. 1
1−α∗
F ). If a ﬁrm cannot re-optimize its price, the price





with γH denoting price indexation.
Concerning exports, we assume that, in country H,af r a c t i o nη (respectively η∗ in country F)o fe x -
portersexhibitproducer-currency-pricing(PCP)while theremainingﬁrms exhibitlocal-currency-pricing
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PH ,R˜ ERF =
˜ PF
SP∗
F and ˜ T =
˜ PF
PH . Export margins




PH and RERF = PF
SP∗
F . In the presence of international
price discrimination, these ratios measure the relative proﬁtability of foreign sales compared with the




Pt is the real exchange rate.
In modeling the ﬁrms’ decision problem we follow closely Adjemian et al. [2008], to which the reader is
referred for details and derivations.
2.8 Residential goods sectors
Final producers of residential goods operate in perfectcompetition and aggregate a continuum of differ-
entiated domestic intermediate products. Final and intermediate residential goods are non-traded. The
elementary differentiated goods are imperfect substitutes with elasticity of substitution denoted
μD
μD−1.
Final goods are produced with the following technology ZD =





. For a domestic
producth,wedeno tepD(h) itsprice. TheaggregatepriceindexisdeﬁnedasPD =














Residentialgoods areproducedby combining capital, labor and land. We assume that ineveryperiod of
time the savers areendowed with a given amount of land, which they sell to the ﬁrms in aﬁxed quantity.
We assume that the supply of land is exogenously ﬁxed and that each residential goods intermediate































t are exogenous technology parameters and Lt(h) denotes the endowment of land
used by producer h at time t.
As in the non-residential sector, ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors. For local sales, ﬁrms set prices
on a staggered basis à la Calvo [1983], with a constant probability 1 − αD of being able to re-optimize
their nominal price. Indexation to past and steady-state inﬂation is allowed, in a similar way to the one
discussed for the non-residential goods ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm cannot re-optimize its price, the price evolves





with γD denoting the degree of price indexation. We also include a time varying tax on ﬁrms’ revenues
which is affected by an iid shock: 1 − τDt =( 1− τD)ε
PD
t .
The details of the residential goods ﬁrms’ problem are spelled out in the Appendix.16
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2.9 Government and monetary authority
In each country, public expenditures G are subject to random shocks εG
t . The government ﬁnances pub-
lic spending with labor tax, production and distribution taxes and lump-sum transfers.
Monetary policy is speciﬁed in terms of an interest rate rule targeting CPI inﬂation, detrended log-
output and their ﬁrst difference. In the benchmark speciﬁcation, we do not include housing prices in
the interest rate rules. Written in deviation from the steady state, the interest feedback rule used has the
form:






where lower case letters denote log-deviations of a variable from its deterministic steady-state.
2.10 Market clearing conditions
Aggregate investment and capital stock are given by:
I
j





t =( 1− ω)K
sj
t (11)
for j = C,D. Similar relations apply for country F.
Aggregate domestic demands for non-residential goods are given by:
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Market clearing conditions in non-residential goods markets lead to the following relations:
Zt = ntΔH,t (TH,t)





































































df measure price dispersions among products of country H and F, either sold locally or17
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exported.
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non-residential intermediate goods of country H and F.
Equilibrium in the bond markets implies that B∗
H,t + B∗
F,t =   B∗
F,t and BH,t + BF,t =   BH,t. Moreover,





















H,t − Yt (22)
where RERt is the real exchange rate measured with consumer prices net of consumption taxes.


















t ds,r e s p e c -
tively.
3 Bayesian Estimation
The model is estimated on US and euro area data by means of Bayesian likelihood methods. For each
country, we consider 11 key macroeconomic quarterly time series from 1981q1 to 2005q4 11 : output,
consumption, non-residential ﬁxed investment, hours worked, real wages, GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate,
CPI inﬂation rate, 3 month short-term interest rate, residential investment, real house prices and total
household debt. We also introduce in the estimation the exchange rate and the US current account12.A l l
variables are linearly detrended prior to estimation.
In the following, country H represents the US and country F, the euro area. Euro area parameters and
shocks are therefore denoted with a *, in line with the model description of the previous section. We
summarize here the exogenous stochastic shocks that we introduce:
11The choice of the estimation sample reﬂects the availability of housing sector data for the Euro Area.
12See Appendix for a detailed description of the dataset.18
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t, εI∗





t ), consumption preferences (εB
t , εB∗
t ), housing preferences (εD
t , εD∗
t ),
relative home bias (εΔn
t ), loan-to-value ratio (εLTV
t , εLTV ∗
t ).
• Inefﬁcient shocks: PPI markups (εP
t , εP∗
t ), CPI markups (εCPI
t , εCPI∗





t ), UIP (εΔS
t ).
• Monetary policy shocks (εR
t , εR∗
t ).
We also allow for the existence of common factors on some speciﬁc shocks. The motivation relies on the
two-country natureof the model, which is supposed to capturecross-country dynamics only, while leav-
ing the interactions between the two regions and the rest of the world unexplained. However, shocks
originating from the rest of the world, or unspeciﬁed spillovers cannot be ruled out ex ante. Therefore,
we modify the shocks structure to account for additional sources of economic ﬂuctuations. As a ﬁrst
step, we include possible common factors on productivity shocks in the non-residential sector (fA
t ), CPI
markup shocks (fCPI
t ) and monetary policy shocks (fR
t ) 13.
In addition, like Adjemian et al. [2008], we introduce some correlations among structural shocks, to
account for possible unmodelled spillovers. In particular, since we use US total net trade instead of
bilateral net trade data in estimation, we introduce a correlation between the US home bias preference
shock and the euro area public expenditure shock. Such correlation - denoted ρn,G∗- is meant to capture
rest-of-the-world shocks that affect the US current account, with moderate immediate impact on euro
area output. Moreover, considering the weak structural interpretation attributed to UIP shocks in a
ﬁrst-order approximation of the model, it seems justiﬁed to allow for links with other shocks. Hence,
we include in the estimation some correlation terms between the UIP shock and other efﬁcient shocks, in
order to account for the impact of fundamental shocks on the time-varying risk premium. In particular,
we consider correlations between the UIP shock and the US non-residential productivity shock (ρA,ΔS)
and between the UIP shock and government expenditure shocks in both areas (ρG,ΔS)a n d( ρG∗,ΔS).
The presence of such terms helps the model generating the observed positive comovement between
consumption and business investment.
3.1 Calibrated parameters
Some parameters are excluded from the estimation and have to be calibrated. In general, this concerns
parametersdriving the steady state values of the state variables, for which the econometric model based
on detrended data is almost noninformative.
In particular, the discount factors are calibrated to 0.99 for the patient agents and 0.96 for the impatient
agents14. The calibration is the same for the US and the Euro Area. The implied equilibrium real interest
rate is 4% in annual terms15. The depreciation rate for housing, δ, is equal to 0.01, corresponding to
13The three common factors were selected on the basis of their signiﬁcance in explaining macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and the
implied marginal data density.
14See e.g. Iacoviello [2005]a n dIacoviello and Neri [2007]a n dMonacelli [2006] for a thorough discussion of the calibration of
the discount factors in a similar setup.
15The steady-state level of the interest rate is pinned down by the savers’ intertemporal discount factor.19
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an annual rate of 4%, whereas the depreciation rate of capital is set to 0.1. Markups are constant across
countries and equal to 1.3 in the goods markets (for both nonresidential and residentialgoods) and 1.5 in
the labor market (in each sector). The relative share of residential goods in the utility function, ωD,i ss e t
to 0.1 in both countries. The value is chosen to pin down the steady state ratio of residential investment
to GDP. The intratemporal elasticity of substitution, ηD,i se q u a lt o1. The relative shares of inputs in
production are 0.3 for capital and 0.7 for labor in the nonresidential goods sector, while in the residential
sector we assign a weight equal to 0.1 to land, and reduce the share of capital to 0.2, in order to maintain
the level of labor intensity unchanged. Regarding nominal rigidities in the residential goods sector, we
assume ﬂexible prices as in Iacoviello and Neri [2007].
Finally, we calibrate the loan-to-value ratio (determined by the terms (1 − χ) and (1 − χ∗)), to 0.8 in
both areas. Although these two parameters could in principle be included in the estimation set, keeping
them ﬁxed - at the same level - helps focusing the attention on the estimation of the relative shares of
borrowers (ω and ω∗). Moreover, existing empirical studies16 document the presence of a substantial
degree of heterogeneity within the euro area in terms of mortgage markets ﬂexibility, with some coun-
tries as the Netherlands being close to the US, and others (e.g. Germany and Italy) displaying a much
smaller degree of ﬂexibility. The proposed calibration of χ∗ thus provides an approximated average
across European countries.
3.2 Prior distributions
Prior distributions of the structural parameters are assumed to be the same across countries, following a
common practice in the literature17. The standard errors of the structural shocks are assumed to follow
a Uniform distribution over the [0,6] interval18, while the persistence parameters follow a Beta distri-
bution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. The UIP-correlations are normally distributed in the
(0,1) interval, whereas the remaining correlation terms are uniformly distributed.
About the parameters of the monetary policy reaction function, we follow Smets and Wouters [2005]and
Adjemian et al. [2008] quite closely. The interest rate smoothing parameter follows a Beta distribution
with parameters 0.75 and 0.1. The parameters capturing the response to changes in inﬂation and output
gap follow a Gamma distribution with parameters 0.3 and 0.1, and 0.12 and 0.05, respectively. Con-
cerning the short-run response to inﬂation and output gap, the prior distributions are a Normal with
mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.25, and a Gamma with parameters 0.12 and 0.05, respectively. About
preference parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is common to both household
types, follows a Gamma distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation 0.375. The habit formation
parameters are speciﬁc to savers and borrowers, following a Beta distribution with parameters 0.5 and
0.1. The elasticity of labor supply is the same for both household types and sectors, and has a Gamma(2,
0.75) prior distribution. On the production side, the adjustment cost parameter for investment and the
capacity utilization elasticity, which are common to residential and non-residential sectors, follow re-
16See Calza et al. [2007].
17See, among others, Smets and Wouters [2005].
18Four shocks deviate from this assumption: ε
Q
t , which is uniformly distributed over [0,20], εH
t and ε
Q∗
t ,w h i c ha r eU[0,10],
and εI∗
t , which follows an Inverted Gamma (0.5,Inf).20
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spectively a Normal(4, 1.5) and a Beta(0.5, 0.15) prior distributions. About nominal rigidities, the Calvo
parametersfor price setting in the non-residential sector and wage settings in each sector aredistributed
accordingto a Beta distribution with mean 0.75 and standard deviation 0.05. The indexation parameters
areinstead centeredaround0.5,with a standarddeviationof 0.15. Finally, concerningthe openeconomy
parameters, we use fairly noninformative distributions for the elasticity of intratemporal substitution,
the parameters related to the share of PCP producers, the degree of home bias in consumption and the
elasticity of foreign exchange risk premium with respect to past exchange rate changes. The prior on the
elasticity of the risk premium to net foreign assets is a Normal(1,0.25), the parameter being re-scaled by
a factor 100.
The main estimated parameters driving the aggregate amount of credit frictions in both economies are
the country-speciﬁc shares of impatient agents (ω and ω∗). In the benchmark estimation, the priors for
those parameters are set as Beta distribution, with mean 0.35 and standard deviation 0.05. This choice
is similar to the one of Iacoviello and Neri [2007]. The model is still well-deﬁned when the share of
borrowers goes to zero so that the estimation of the parameters is not affected by a singular point in
zero. Given the crucial role of ω and ω∗ in the model, we also investigate the ﬁt of the model with
alternative prior distributions. We return to this in the next section.
3.3 Posterior distributions
Table 1 reports the mode, the mean and the 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution of
the structural parameters, obtained using the Metropolis - Hastings algorithm. Some of the results are
similar to estimates found in the literature using similar models without housing sector for the US and
the euro area (see for example Smets and Wouters [2005]o rAdjemian et al. [2008]). We concentrate on
the features which may be more closely related to our expanded modeling framework with respect to
the sectoral structure of the economy and the heterogeneity of households’ types.
Among the stochastic exogenous disturbances, the government expenditure, UIP risk premium and
housing preference shocks have the highest estimated persistence. In particular, the estimated means
for the autoregressive parameter of the housing preference shocks are 0.97 for the US and 0.99 for the
Euro Area. Such a high estimated degree of persistence suggests that the process will tend to explain a
lot of the long horizon forecast error variance of the real variables. In general, the housing sector pro-
cesses display a high persistence, as the estimated values for ρAD, ρLTV and ρH all lie above 0.93 in both
countries.
About the behavioral parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σC, is well below the prior
mean: the estimated posterior means are in fact 0.64 for the U.S. and 1.06 for the Euro Area. The habit
persistence parameters (hB and hS, respectively) indicate a much lower degree of persistence in the
consumption plans of the borrowers, as opposed to the savers, in both areas. The estimated degrees of
price stickiness in the non-residential goods sector are generally higher than the prior mean (0.75), and
in particular the estimates are higher in the Euro Area than in the U.S., conﬁrming a result reported in
Smets and Wouters [2005]a n dAdjemian et al. [2008]. In the benchmark estimation, residential property21
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prices are speciﬁed as ﬂexible. This assumption is supported by estimations of Calvo parameters for the
residentialgoods pricesetting veryclose tozeroinbothcountries (resultsnot reportedhere). Given such
low levels of nominal rigidities, we preferredto keep the ﬂexible price assumption. Wages are estimated
to be slightly more ﬂexible in the Euro Area, both in the non-residential and in the residential sector. All
the indexation parameters, however, seem to be poorly identiﬁed, as indicated by the similarity of prior
and posterior distributions.
Regarding open economy parameters, results in the benchmark model are broadly similar to the ones
of Adjemian et al. [2008], with nonetheless a lower estimate for the trade elasticity. Finally, about the
monetary policy reaction function, the baseline estimates tend to suggest that monetary policy reacted
relatively more strongly to inﬂation in the U.S. than in the Euro Area over the estimation sample. Inter-
est rate smoothing was also more pronounced in the Euro Area.
We turn now to the parameters capturing the share of borrowers in each economy (ω and ω∗). In the
baseline speciﬁcation, the estimated posterior modes are 0.24 and 0.19, respectively for the US and the
euro area. Those values are below the prior mean which is set at 0.25. The shape of the posterior dis-
tributions suggests that data are not very informative on this direction. We conduct some sensitivity
analysis on the prior distributions for those parameters. Table 4 reports the estimates obtained when the
prior distributions for ω and ω∗ are shifted towards a mean of 0.5. In this case the estimated posterior
modes are 0.46 and 0.42, respectively. Again, a look at prior and posterior distributions suggests a lack
of information from the data. We also estimated the model using uniform priors which led to posterior
values for the shares around 5% (estimation not reported here). Note that, even with uninformative
priors, the estimation does not set the share of borrowers to 0, which would be possible in our paramet-
ric setting. In terms of marginal log-data density, it reaches -2485.19 for the benchmark speciﬁcation,
compared to -2509.115 with the high share priors and -2478.3 with the uniform priors.
Overall, our results suggests that ω and ω∗ are not strongly identiﬁed given the dataset used. The
presence of borrowers does not seem to be rejected given that all speciﬁcations lead to strictly positive
values for such shares, but model comparison based on marginal data density would favor lower shares
than in the benchmark estimation. A possible explanation for such a weak identiﬁcation is linked to the
informational content of the observable variables as opposed to the model-generated series. Although
the model deﬁnes individual consumption plans for borrowers and savers, in practice only aggregate
consumption data are observable in each sector, for a given country. Therefore, it is difﬁcult to extract
information on individual characteristics - such as habit persistence in consumption, or the relative
weight of patient and impatient agents in the group of consumers - from aggregate data. Consequently,
the prior distributions will have a substantial impact on the posterior estimates and should be carefully
chosen based on economic information which may not be adequately reﬂected in the dataset. Even if
it deteriorates the marginal data density, we privileged priors for the benchmark estimation which are
similar to Iacoviello and Neri [2007] and seem satisfying in terms of steady state aggregate levels of
households’ debt compared to GDP.22
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3.4 Second order moments
Table 5 compares some selected second-order moments implied by the estimated model with the corre-
sponding moments measured in the data. We use both linearly detrended and HP-ﬁltered data 19.
The volatilities of US residential and business investment are slightly underestimated in the model with
respect to the data. In the euro area, the estimated standard deviation of residential investment is higher
thanthe observedone, whereasthe volatilities of house pricesand business investment arelower. About
the open economy variables, the estimates tend to overweight the volatility of the exchange rate and un-
derweight the volatility of the current account. Overall, we obtain a better match between the data and
the estimated model when we use HP-ﬁltered series.
In terms of real variables comovement, we match the sign of almost all correlations. In particular,
we replicate the negative comovement between the exchange rate and the current account, and the
negative correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate, thus accounting for the
consumption-real exchange rate anomaly (see Chari et al. [2002]). Our general setup, including various
types of shocks, thus appears to be more appropriate than standard stylized NOEM models in gen-
erating such an observed feature of the data. Given our set of common shocks across countries, the
cross-country correlation of output is positive in the model but lower than in the data. The measured
comovement of consumption in the data is not robust to the ﬁltering method nor to slight modiﬁcations
in the sample length, but it seems that the model generates too low correlation. The presence of com-
mon trends in the exogenous shocks to non-residential goods productivity, monetary policy and CPI
helps the model generating enough cross-country spillovers, which are reﬂected into small but positive
international correlations in real activity.
Turning now to the housing variables, the correlations of consumption and residential investment with
realhouse prices are qualitatively reproducedby the model, albeit on the low side concerning consump-
tion. However, the correlations of consumption and aggregate output with residential investment gen-
eratedby the model aresubstantially below the sample ones. This may suggest the introduction of some
common shocks across sectors like government spending or productivity. Regarding the cross-country
correlations of housing prices and residential investment, some attention should be paid regarding the
measurement of international comovement in the housing sector data. On the full sample, the comove-
ment of residential investment is negative when we use detrended data but positive with HP ﬁltering.
For real housing prices, the correlation is positive and lower with HP ﬁltering than with detrending.
Against this background, the model implies almost no correlation for both housing prices and residen-
tial investment. Given the uncertainty about the true evidence to match, it is important to identify the
type of structural disturbances which can allow for either positive or negative cross-country correla-
tions. This issue we will be touched upon in the next section.
Indeed, although the full-sample cross-country correlation of house prices is positive, the comovement
19 More precisely, the different sepciﬁcations of the model are all estimated on linearly detrendeddata. When reporting second-
order moments,we ﬁlter the model statistics using linear detrendingand HP ﬁlter, respectively. Columns 2 to 4 and 5 to 8 in Table
5 thus compare model-generated moments with the data, using the same ﬁltering procedure.23
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becomes negative if we exclude the period 1998 q1: 2005 q4. During such period in fact, house prices
in both countries show some clear evidence of a higher local trend, which a simple linear detrending
procedure cannot completely offset. Over the same period, residential investment also shows signs of
a trend, especially in the US. Therefore, when we rely on the most stable part of our dataset, we can
infer that a negative international comovement is actually observed in the data for both house prices
and residential investment. All in all, it is very likely that the size of our sample is not large enough to
capturethe unconditional second order moments of housing data given the considerable length of cycli-
cal ﬂuctuations in the housing sector. The dataset may actually only cover two medium-term housing
cycles.
Aﬁnal consideration regardsthe implications of strongercreditfrictions in terms ofsimulated moments.
Table 5 also presents the outcome from the estimated model with high priors on the shares of borrowers
whose posterior parameter estimates are reported in Table 4. The High Borrower speciﬁcation seems
to improve upon the benchmark model in several dimensions. First, the domestic correlations between
consumption and housing variables are slightly higher. Moreover, the cross-country correlations of
consumption, and to a lesser extent, housing variables increase marginally.
4 Credit frictions and the international business cycle
In this section, we provide a positive analysis of the role played by housing market functioning on the
transmission mechanism of macroeconomic disturbances and as a source of economic ﬂuctuations. The
impulse response functions analyzed here are based on the benchmark estimated model. On a system-
atic basis, the effect of credit frictions are illustrated by comparing the outcome of the benchmark model
to the one obtained by assuming either that borrowers are absent, or that their share in the economy
corresponds to the High Borrower case. In the following, we ﬁrst examine the contribution of hous-
ing shocks to business cycle ﬂuctuations. Then, the sensitivity of macroeconomic propagation to the
presence of ﬁnancially constrained consumers is explored in detail.
4.1 Contribution of housing shocks to economic ﬂuctuations
Table 6 presents the unconditional variance decomposition of the macroeconomic variables, emphasiz-
ing the contribution of housing-related structural shocks. The aggregate role of housing shocks (both on
the supply side, as in the case of technology and LTV-ratio shocks, and on the demand side, as for the
housing preferenceshock) is particularlyrelevantin explaining thedynamics of housing production and
house prices, for which those shocks explain around 90% of the variance. Housing preference shocks
are the main determinants of real house price ﬂuctuations while they have a more limited role and con-
tribute less than sector-speciﬁc productivity shocks in explaining residential investment. Concerning
household debt in the two areas, housing preferenceand loan-to-value ratio (LTV)shocks generatemore
than 75% of volatility. This reﬂects the model mechanics, with the borrowers adjusting very sharply and
immediately to shocks that directly impact the collateral constraint. This is obviously the case for LTV
shocks, as well as housing preference shocks, through their sizeable inﬂuence on real housing prices.
Overall, the relative ﬂexibility of house prices allows for signiﬁcant adjustments in the face of sectoral24
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shocks.
On the non-residential goods sector, the spillovers of housing-related shocks are moderate. Housing
preference shocks explain around 5% and 3% of consumption volatility in the euro area and the US
respectively, while the contribution of LTV shocks and productivity shocks is lower. Regarding other
domestic variables, a relevant feature concerns the effects of housing preference shocks on CPI inﬂation
and nominal interest rate ﬂuctuations, which are ranging between 5 and 10% in the euro area. Such
results are related to the higher persistence of the shock for the euro area as shown in the previous sub-
section.
Turning to the open economy dimension, housing shocks are essentially affecting a non-tradable sector
with ﬂexible prices. Consequently, with interest rate feedback rules targeting non-residential inﬂation
rate, both the direct trade channel and the scope for exchange rate adjustment in the cross-country
propagation of housing shocks are relatively muted compared with disturbances originating from the
tradable sector. Regarding more speciﬁcally the international spillovers on activity, the role of housing
shocks is indeed quite limited. Beyond this, note thatthe estimated model implies a relatively low trans-
mission of domestic shocks across countries20.
In order to explore the sensitivity of the structural decomposition of business cycle ﬂuctuations to the
amount of credit frictions in the economy, Table 7 replicates the previous exercise by setting ﬁrst the
share of borrowers to zero in both countries, and second by ﬁxing them at their estimated values ob-
tained for the High Borrower case in Table 4. We observe ﬁrst that the structural decomposition of
house price and residential investment ﬂuctuations are hardly affected by the size of credit-constrained
consumers in the economy. Therefore, the main implications of varying the borrowers’ shares can be an-
alyzed through the aggregate substitution effect between residential and non-residential goods, which
guides the magnitude of the macroeconomic transmission to consumption and non-residential invest-
ment, for a given impact on the price and quantities in the residential sector. The main variable affected
is household consumption: the contribution of housing-related shocks reaches23%in the US and 17% in
the euroareawith high shares of borrowers, against less than 1% when borrowers areabsent. Aggregate
output is also more sensitive to housing shocks when stronger credit frictions are activated.
4.2 The propagation of non housing-related shocks
We concentrate now on the propagation of some selected shocks, not directly related to the housing
market. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the transmission of US shocks.
4.2.1 Monetary policy shock
The impulse response are presented in Figure 1. An increase in the short-term interest rate reduces
domestic demand in both sectors and generates a contraction of output. The combination of higher
interest rates and lower house prices leads the borrowers to reduce debt, thus amplifying the negative
effect of the shock on aggregate consumption and output. Noticeably, the reduction in the inﬂation rate,
20A limited role for cross-country spillovers is a usual result in the literature (see Adjemian et al. [2008] among others).25
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brought about by the weakening of economic activity, is detrimental to the borrowers, since it increases
the ex-post value of existing debt. As a result, the monetary shock becomes more contractionary when
the share of borrowers in the economy increases. The rise in the interest rate induces an exchange rate
appreciation. On balance, the current account deteriorates. The US monetary contraction produces a
positive spillover effect on foreign aggregate output. The exchange rate adjustment together with mon-
etary policy tightening in the euro area generates substantial substitution effects away from residential
investment and domestic demand for tradable goods.
Absent the possibility of borrowing (i.e. when ω = ω∗ =0 ), the monetary transmission mechanism only
works through nominal rigidities, as in a standard NOEM model. Without the collateral channel, the
impact response of domestic consumption and output is signiﬁcantly weaker. The interest rate increase
is still sufﬁcient to generate an exchange rate appreciation. The resulting adjustment in net imports
implies a larger positive spillover on foreign output with respect to the baseline case.
4.2.2 Labor supply shock
We consider now a labor supply shock (see Figure 2) as a paradigmatic example of a supply shock
that symmetrically hits both sectors of production21. An increase in labor supply in both sectors gener-
ates downward pressures on real wages, which gradually lead to higher labour demand. Inﬂation falls
below baseline due to a fall in the real marginal cost and monetary policy accommodates the supply
shock. Production increases in both sectors, with house prices featuring a hump-shaped response. The
impact on aggregate consumption is quite sensitive to the share of borrowers in the economy: individ-
ual responses to the shock are in fact very different. The response of the savers is standard: a labor
supply shock generates an increase in consumption - via the intratemporal optimal trade-off between
consumption and labor. Noticeably, the increase in house prices drives the savers’ user cost of resi-
dential investment up22, implying a substitution effect in favor of non-residential consumption. On the
other hand, the borrowers respond to a negative labour income shock in the short term by reducing their
present consumption of both goods, as they do not smooth consumption intertemporally. As a conse-
quence, debt decreases, despite the potentially positive incentive to borrow generated by higher house
prices and lower interest rates. Aggregate consumption will therefore reﬂect more one behavior or the
other, depending on the relative weights attached to the individual responses. With higher borrowers’
share, the substitution effects away from non-residential consumption towards residential investment
are ampliﬁed, as shown by the lower aggregate user cost of housing, which accentuates the downward
pressures on inﬂation and the extend of policy accommodation.
The exchange rate depreciates, driven by the fall in the interest rate. The expenditure - switching effect
dominates and the current account experiences a surplus. As a result, a negative spillover is generated
on foreign output, whereas domestic demand and residential investment in the euro area both rise as
more goods are imported at lower prices and lower interest rate boosts durable goods expenditures.
Foreign private debt also increases, as a result of both higher house prices and a lower interest rate.
21Thestochastic structure of themodel also includes two sector-speciﬁc productivityshocks, which howeverhave verydifferent
effects because of the different degrees of nominal rigidities in the two sectors.
22The deﬁnition of the saver’s (and the borrower’s) user cost of residential investment is given in the Appendix.26
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The speciﬁc role of the borrowers is quite intuitive. Increasing their share generates a negative impact
response of consumption to the shock, thus calling for a sharper reduction in the interest rate. The ex-
change rate in turn depreciates more and the negative spillover on foreign output is more pronounced.
Conversely, absent the borrowers, the reverse holds true: domestic consumption increases more (reﬂect-
ing the savers’ decisions), the short-term interest rate decreases by a smaller amount, causing a reduced
depreciation and generating a smaller spillover on foreign output.
4.2.3 Government spending shock
A positive shock to government expenditure (which by assumption only refers to the non-residential
goods sector) generates very different responses across the two groups of agents (see Figure 3). The
savers, behaving as standard consumption smoothers, perceive the negative wealth effect associated
with an increase in the expected future stream of taxes and thus reduce their current consumption. Ri-
cardian equivalence holds true for them. The borrowers instead act as non-smoothing consumers, so an
increase in current income - generated by higher government expenditure - fosters higher consumption
of both goods. However, debt falls on impact and remains negative for some periods, due to lower
house prices and a higher interest rate23.
The impact response of aggregate consumption deserves some attention. Two factors interplay to deter-
mine consumption dynamics. Increasing the share of borrowers emphasizes the positive income effect
of higher government expenditure, and mutes the negative wealth effect. Nominal rigidities also play
a role. In the goods market, price stickiness in the non-residential sector implies that ﬁrms tend to
respond to the increase in aggregate demand by shifting up labor demand. However, nominal wage
rigidity does not allow for signiﬁcant increases in wage income. Conversely, absent nominal rigidities
in the labor market, wages would adjust upwards to the shift in labor demand and provide additional
income to both agents. As a result, consumption would decrease by less. Interestingly, the combination
of ﬂexible wages and a high share of borrowers would sufﬁce to generate a positive response of con-
sumption to a government expenditure shock. With the benchmark calibration, a positive consumption
response is obtained for a borrower share of around 75%.
Turning to the open-economy effects of the shock, the increase in the interest rate (in response to higher
aggregate demand) implies an exchange rate appreciation and a current account deﬁcit, as both relative
output and relative price effects worsen the external position. A positive spillover effect is generated on
foreign output (with a multiplier of around 0.2), via the change in the terms of trade. Here again, the
exchange rate adjustment together with higher interest rate dampen foreign residential investment, real
house prices and domestic demand for tradablegoods. Noticeably, the response of foreign consumption
is a more negative effect the lower the share of borrowers in the domestic economy.
23The fall in house prices follows from the sector-speciﬁc nature of the government expenditure shock, which is assumed to
refer to the non-residential sector only. Therefore, the relative demand for housing falls.27
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4.2.4 UIP shock
The UIP shock - deﬁned as a risk premium shock in the modiﬁed UIP condition - causes a strong nom-
inal exchange rate appreciation and a current account deterioration (see Figure 4). The interest rate
decreases in the Home country, whereas it increases by almost the same magnitude in the Foreign coun-
try. Domestic demand increases in both sectors, while output decreases, reﬂecting a fall in net exports.
Inﬂation is correspondingly lower in the Home country and higher in the Foreign economy. In particu-
lar, domestic household debt jumps on impact. The combined effect of higher house prices and a lower
interest rate offsets in fact the negative impact of lower CPI inﬂation on the borrowers’ balance sheets.
The opposite holds true in the Foreign country, where household debt falls. As the shock directly hits
the interest rate, the effects of varying the share of borrowers are mainly concentrated on the response
of consumption. Absent the borrowers, the partial offsetting effect of lower inﬂation on consumption
is eliminated, and the demand for nonresidential goods is correspondingly higher. Again, the opposite
effect is observed in the Foreign country, where consumption falls more.
4.3 The propagation role of housing shocks
4.3.1 Housing preference shock
A housing preference shock is deﬁned here as an exogenous stochastic perturbation to the marginal
rate of substitution between non-residential and residential consumption in the utility function of each
agent. A positive housing preference shock thus generates a surge in housing demand and house prices
(see Figures 5 and 6). Both effects are quite persistent over time, so that prices and quantities are still
well above their steady state value after 20 quarters. The most interesting effect concerns the impact re-
sponse of consumption, which is positive and increasing in the share of borrowers in the economy. The
positive response of aggregate consumption is due to the collateral channel: by issuing more debt - made
possible by the positive valuation effect of higher house prices on the existing collateral - the borrowers
can ﬁnance extra consumption, thus consuming immediately more. Monetary policy responds to a gen-
eralized increase in domestic demand by raising the interest rate, which in turn causes an exchange rate
appreciation. The current account deteriorates by a small amount on impact and the excess domestic
demand in the source country leads to a positive effect on foreign output. The size of this spillover
ranges between 0.05 and 0.1 which is, as expected, less than the multipliers emanating from demand
shocks on the tradable sector. The exchange rate adjustment coupled with a monetary policy tightening
induces in the foreign country a broad substitution effect away from nonresidential and domestically
produced residential goods. As a result, house prices and residential investment fall below baseline in
the foreign country.
All the above-mentioned effects are ampliﬁed when the share of borrowers increases: the ampliﬁcation
reﬂects notably the mechanical aggregation effect across the two different groups of consumers. With-
out borrowing instead, the response of domestic consumption to the housing preferenceshock is muted.
Intuitively, without impatient households, there is no positive effectof higher house prices on consump-
tion, because there is no collateral to be affected. The increase in house prices generates a higher user
cost of housing for the savers (who now represent the entire group of households in the economy) and28
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calls for a substitution from residential investment to consumption. However, the overall increase in
domestic aggregate demand is lower than in the presence of borrowers. The required increase in the
interest rate is therefore much smaller, and so is the exchange rate appreciation. The effect on the cur-
rent account is also reduced, so that the spillover on foreign output falls by a half relative to the baseline
case.
4.3.2 Housing technology shock
A positive productivity shock in the residential sector generates a sharp and persistent reduction in
house prices, which are more ﬂexible than nonresidential goods prices (see Figures 7 and 8). Intuitively,
ﬁrms in the housing sector can almost fully exploit the technology improvement by adjusting prices and
quantities in opposite directions. Residential investment indeed increases signiﬁcantly on impact, with
apersistent effect. The behaviorof domestic demandfollows fromthe individual responsesto theshock.
For the savers, an increase in housing supply, accompanied by a reduction in prices, generates a higher
demand for residential investment. Moreover, the decrease in house prices lowers the savers’ user cost
of housing, generating a substitution effect from nonresidential to residential goods. Wage income also
increases for the savers, who are accommodating the increase in labor demand in the residential-goods
sector through the provision of more labor supply. The reverseholds true forthe borrowers. A sustained
decrease in house prices induces a negative valuation effect on the existing collateral, making borrowing
more costly. As a result, the borrowers demand less of both goods compared with the savers, and debt
decreases on impact in the source country. In addition, the borrowers have a stronger incentive to sub-
stitute residential investment for consumption goods in order to relax their collateral constraint. The
resulting negative aggregate effect on consumption reduces CPI inﬂation, while aggregate output in-
creases slightly.
Turning to the open-economy dimension, the transmission crucially depends on the response of mon-
etary policy to aggregate demand. In the benchmark case, aggregate demand increases - reﬂecting the
large increase in housing demand which offsets the fall in consumption - and inﬂation falls. The central
bank responds by raising the interest rate. As a result, the exchange rate appreciates. The effect on the
current account is very close to zero, and a very small positive spillover is generated on foreign output.
Foreign demand for domestically-produced goods falls, as well as house prices and debt.
Increasing the share of borrowers in the Home country reinforces the substitution effect in favor of
residential goods (as portrayed by a lower aggregate user cost of housing), which dampens the initial
response of aggregate consumption. Aggregate output also falls below its steady state level in the ﬁrst
quarter after the shock. Given the downward pressures on consumer prices, monetary policy responds
by decreasing the nominal interest rate, and the exchange rate appreciation is reduced by one half with
respect to the baseline case. The current account now improves more, and a marginal negative spillover
is generated on foreign output, with a small but positive substitution effect from the nonresidential to
the residential goods sector. Conversely, setting the share of borrowers to zero increases Home output,
and calls for an increase in the nominal interest rate. The exchange rate appreciation becomes larger than
in the benchmark case, the current account now deteriorates, and the the positive spillover on Foreign29
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output is stronger.
4.3.3 Loan-to-value ratio shock
A positive shock to the LTV ratio corresponds to an exogenous, temporary increase in the availability
of funds to the borrowers in the domestic economy (see Figures 9 and 10). The borrowers thus de-
mand more of both goods, driving house prices up. In particular, the relative ﬂexibility of prices in the
housing sector originates a sharp and sustained increase in house prices, whereas consumption-goods
inﬂation moves slowly, due to nominal rigidities. Debt increases, fostered by the positive valuation ef-
fect of higher house prices on the existing collateral, and by the exogenous increase in the LTV ratio. The
rise in house prices increases the user cost of housing for the savers and generates a substitution effect
from residential investment to consumption. The increase in inﬂation calls for an interest rate rise. As a
consequence, the exchange rate appreciates on impact and the current account deteriorates in the short
term. However, the initial exchange rate appreciation is rapidly followed by a depreciation of a similar
magnitude. The LTV shock generates a positive spillover on foreign output. The size of the spillover
on economic activity is however smaller compared with the housing preference shocks notably due to a
more moderate exchange rate adjustment. A broad substitution effect is observed in the Foreign econ-
omy, away from residential goods and domestically produced non-residential goods.
An increase in the share of borrowers reinforces the collateral channel in the Home country24 .D e m a n d
and prices increase more in both sectors, thus requiring a stronger response of monetary policy to in-
ﬂation. The exchange rate swings are more pronounced, and all of the previously described spillover
effects on the Foreign country are ampliﬁed.
4.4 Summing up
This section has provided a detailed description of the internal propagation mechanism of the model,
with a special focus on the role played by housing markets and collateral constraints. Overall, the pres-
ence of credit frictions has the effect of altering the relative responses of aggregate consumption and
non-residential investment to exogenous shocks. More precisely, moving the share of borrowers is im-
plicitly equivalent to attributing more or less importance to credit constraints and thus inﬂuences the
propagation of standarddemand and supply shocks. In the case of a government expenditureshock, for
instance, increasing the share of borrowers implies less negative (eventually positive) effects on aggre-
gate consumption, but at the same time generates a largercrowding out effecton private non-residential
investment. The introduction of housing-speciﬁc shocks generates nontrivial dynamics. In particular,
housing preference and loan-to-value ratio shocks are based on the collateral channel,a n dd e t e r m i n ea n
immediate increase in household debt. The impact on aggregate consumption and investment are thus
both positively inﬂuenced by an increase in the share of borrowers.
The housing sector plays a special role in the model, due to its dual nature of ﬂexible-price, non-traded
goods producingsector. On the one hand, prices and quantities arefreeto adjust almost instantaneously
24Clearly, we do not consider the case of no borrowers, which would imply the absence of a debt channel, and prevent the
existence of any LTV-ratio shocks.30
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to external shocks, so that impact responses are usually large. On the other hand, as the residential in-
vestment good is non-traded, sectoral shocks typically generate very small, indirect spillover effects
on foreign country variables. The residential sector is therefore somewhat unaffected by shifts in the
share of borrowers: the impact responses of prices and quantities are large enough that varying the
size of the borrowers’ group only marginally affects the overall adjustment. Nonetheless, structural
housing-related shocks generate signiﬁcant spillovers to non-residential consumption through the col-
lateral channel and therefore the share of borrowers in the economy.
Turning to the open economy dimension, the housing-related shocks expand the dynamic correlation
properties of the model which may help capturing important features of the dataset. In particular,
there is evidence that the cross-country comovement of residential investment and house prices may
have been negative over extended period of time. The traditional "closed economy" set of non-housing
related shocks generally induces positive correlation in both house prices and residential investment
across countries. Only open economy shocks like foreign exchange risk premium or relative home bias
disturbances generate strong asymmetric responses for most of the variablesacross countries. The intro-
duction of housing shocks turns out to be helpful on this dimension. While housing technology shocks
require a large share of borrowers in order to generate a negative correlation between home and foreign
residential investment, the same result is obtained in the baseline estimation for housing preference,
and to a lesser extent, loan-to-value ratio shocks. More speciﬁcally, the increase in domestic demand
induced by larger borrowing leads to an interest rate raise and an exchange rate appreciation. Exports
of non-residential goods increase; in the Foreign country the increase in the interest rate reduces the de-
mand for residential investment, which in turn drives house prices down. Housing preference shocks
can thus reproduce sizeable negative international comovement in residential investment.
5 Monetary policy and housing prices
In this section, we examine the relationship between monetary policy and house prices along two di-
mensions. First, we evaluate whether the historical policy conduct for the US and the euro area features
a speciﬁc response to house prices. Second, we compare the macroeconomic transmission of housing
shocks under the estimated Taylor rules to the one generated by optimal monetary policy cooperation.
Anin depth analysis of the normative prescriptions thatcould bederivedfromour rich modeling frame-
work is beyond the scope of the present paper.
5.1 The macroeconomic allocation with augmented Taylor rule speciﬁcations
We review here the main properties of the estimated model with augmented Taylor rules, i.e. when rel-
ative house price changes are added as policy target variables in the interest rate feedback rules for the
US and the euro area. Thereafter, we comment on the empirical performance of such alternative speciﬁ-
cations as well as on the implications for the macroeconomic propagation of shocks and the sources of
business cycle ﬂuctuations.
The last three columns of Table 4 report the results obtained once we allow monetary policy to respond31
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to variations in house price inﬂation. The modiﬁed Taylor rule reads:







We use a N(0,0.5) prior distribution for the parameters rΔTD and r∗
ΔTD, in order to allow for both posi-
tive and negative responses to house price inﬂation. The corresponding estimated posterior modes are
0.10 in the US and 0.17 in the euro area, respectively. Both central banks thus mildly increase the interest
rate in response to positive housing inﬂation rates. The estimated posterior modes for the remaining pa-
rameters in the rule do not signiﬁcantly change in the modiﬁed speciﬁcation, with the only exception of
r∗
π, which increases from 0.84 to 1.47. Several studies have indeed documented the weak identiﬁcation
of the inﬂation level term in the policy rule, whose inference proves not to be robust to slight changes in
priors or rule speciﬁcation (see Adjemian et al. [2007]o rAdjemian et al. [2008] for example).
Interestingly, the inclusion of these two additional coefﬁcients in the estimation set largely improves
the ﬁt of the model: the log marginal density increases from -2485.19 in the benchmark speciﬁcation to
-2450.12 in the augmented-rule case. We could therefore conclude that a more accurate historical de-
scription of monetary policy in the US and the euro area - over the estimation sample, at least - should
include a systematic response to house price inﬂation.
Beyond marginal data density comparison, we assess the model’s ability to replicate the selected second
moments reported in Table 5: along this dimension, the augmented Taylor rule model does not provide
a strong departure from the patterns obtained in the benchmark case. At the margin, the augmented
Taylor rule model reduces the correlation between non-residential consumption and real house prices
comparedwith the benchmark case, notably for the US,which may be less in line with data. At the same
time, regardingthe root mean square errors, evaluatedin sample, the augmented Taylor rule model pro-
vides some improvements on most of the variables, in particular on real quantities (results not reported
here).
Some further observations concern the historical role of housing preference shocks in explaining busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations. Augmenting the monetary policy rule has two main consequences (results not
reported here). First, it is immediate to note that housing preference shocks account for a larger fraction
of the policy rate volatility. The interest rate in fact is now allowed to endogenously respond to ﬂuc-
tuations in house prices, which in turn are mainly driven by housing preference shocks in the model.
Fluctuations in the policy rate will thus partly reﬂect the need to counteract the effect of inﬂationary
demand shocks in the housing sector. Second, and related to the previous point, housing preference
shocks explain much less of residential investment volatility, and to a lesser extent, of real house price
ﬂuctuations. The effect is robust across countries. In the benchmark speciﬁcation, a positive demand
shock in the housing sector - which moves residential investment and house prices in the same direc-
tion - has a large and signiﬁcant effect on residential investment. When monetary policy is allowed to
respond to housing inﬂation, the interest rate will move up in response to a positive demand shock.
As a consequence, the cost of borrowing will increase, dampening the initial increase in the demand for
housing. Overall, residential investment will ﬂuctuate less in response to movements in prices when the
central bank is more reactive. Real house price ﬂuctuations will be reduced as well by the counteracting32
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effect of the monetary tightening.
Both effects are immediately recognized by looking at the impulse response functions associated to a
housing preference shock, reported in Figure 11. When monetary policy responds to housing inﬂation,
a larger increase in the policy rate is required in response to the shock. The tightening reduces the initial
increase in house prices and partially counterbalances the surge in residential investment. Moreover,
the overall effect on non-residential consumption becomes negative, for the ampliﬁed increase in the
interest rate neutralizes the positive collateral effect on consumption.
Summing up, it seems that, given our structural description of the housing market functioning, some
degree of systematic response to house price inﬂation in the historical monetary policy conduct for the
US and the Euro Area is supported by the data. Such a speciﬁcation of monetary policy rules however
would not generate a positive response of nonresidential consumption after a housing preferenceshock.
5.2 The optimal monetary policy response to housing shocks
Toderivetheinternational monetarypolicycoordination weproceedasAdjemianetal.[2008]: TheRam-
sey approach to optimal monetary policy cooperation is computed by formulating an inﬁnite-horizon
Lagrangian problem of maximizing the conditional expected social welfare subject to the full set of non-
linear constraints forming the competitive equilibrium of the model. The ﬁrst order conditions to this
problem are obtained using symbolic Matlab procedures.
Since we are mainly interested in comparing the macroeconomic stabilization performances of different
monetary policy regimes within a medium scale open economy framework including a wide set of
shocks and frictions, we assume a ﬁscal intervention, namely subsidies on labor and goods markets,
to offset the ﬁrst order distortions caused by the presence of monopolistic competition in the markets.
From an operational perspective, we have to face the issue that the zero lower bound is an occasionally
binding constraint. To avoid high probabilities of hitting the zero bound under the Ramsey allocation,
we thus follow Woodford [2003] by introducing in the households welfare for each country a quadratic































where λR and λ∗
R are the weights attached to the cost on nominal interest rate ﬂuctuations. Instead
of ﬁxing this parameter to match a particular value of the probability to hit the zero bound, we prag-
matically choose calibration of those parameters so that, under the operational optimal monetary policy
coordination, the unconditional varianceof the nominal interest rates areclose to the ones obtained with
the estimated rules. The penalty needed to achieve those standard deviations is substantially higher in
the US than in the euro area. Under this assumption, the probability to hit the zero bound is reasonably
low, even for a zero steady state inﬂation which implies that the steady state real rate is more than three33
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times the standard deviation of the interest rate. Note that with the indexation schemes introduced in
the price and wage settings, the Ramsey steady state is consistent with any level of inﬂation rate.
Compared with Adjemian et al. [2008], the introduction of a housing sector and patient households fac-
ing ﬁnancial constraints brings several important dimensions to the analysis of optimal monetary policy
cooperation. On the supply side, monetary policy hastofacepolicy tradeoffsfromthe sector dimensions
of the economy which are compounded by the nominal rigidities on the wage setting (see for example
Aoki [2001]on this point). Moreover, the presence of durable goods has meaningful implications for the
optimal allocation, as exposed in Erceg and Levin [2005]. Finally, households heterogeneity and collat-
eral constraints may not only change the policy dilemma regarding price stability and the stabilization
of real quantities, but also introduce an additional policy objective related to the dispersion of alloca-
tions across household types.
5.2.1 Housing preference shock
Thereafter, we do not intend to explore systematically all those factors. Such an exercise would be
beyond the scope of the present paper and is left for further research. We restrict our analysis to the
assessment of the optimal policy tolerance for relative house price ﬂuctuations. More speciﬁcally, we
consider the optimal monetary policy response to housing demand shocks since this source of distur-
bance activates, under standard Taylor rules, strong relative house price changes and ample asymmetry
between savers’ and borrowers’ reactions.
Figures 11 and 12 compare the impulse response functions to housing demand shocks when monetary
policy is speciﬁed either as the estimated interest rate rules of the benchmark model, as the estimated
interest rate rules augmented with real house prices, or as the optimal international cooperation. The
structural parameters are ﬁxed at the mode of their posterior distribution from the benchmark model
estimation. Compared with the IRFs presented in Section 2 of this paper, differencescan arise due to the
fact that we assume here that public subsidies are offsetting steady state distortions.
Regarding domestic transmission, the optimal allocation generates a more muted response of real house
prices and residential investment than with the benchmark policy rules. The optimal spillover of a
positive housing demand shock to non-residential consumption is negative and on balance, aggregate
output contracts. Those features are qualitatively present in the macroeconomic propagation under the
augmented interest rate rules, albeit with a more pronounced pattern. The interest rate response under
the optimal policy and the augmented rules is more restrictive than with the benchmark rules. Regard-
ing the international spillovers, the exchange rate appreciates more on impact with the optimal and the
augmented rules. In the foreign country, the optimal allocation implements a sharper adjustment of real
variable variables while strongly stabilizing the inﬂation rates. Comparing the impulse responses to
US or euro area shocks, it appears that the similarities between the optimal policy and the augmented
interest rate rules, notably on the domestic transmission, are stronger for the US.34
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In order to provide some perspectives on the role of credit frictions in the optimal response to house
prices, the same exercise has been conducted setting the share of borrowers to zero. The corresponding
IRFs are reported in Figures 13 and 14. Some degree of control on house prices is still apparent in the
optimal allocation. However, the "lean against the wind" features of the augmented policy rules now
differ more from the optimal allocation.
Those results can also be illustrated using simple welfare-based interest rate rules. In order to sub-
stantiate more the comparison between the augmented policy rules and the optimal monetary policy
cooperation, the two coefﬁcients on the real house price terms of the augmented policy rules have been
chosen to maximize the aggregate welfare under housing preference shocks, keeping the other parame-
ters ﬁxed. As expected, both optimal coefﬁcients are positive but lower than in the estimated version of
the augmented policy rules; in addition the optimal response to house prices is higher for the US at 0.04
than for the euro area, at 0.02.
5.2.2 Other housing-related shocks
Figure 15 shows the IRFs of a US housing sector productivity shock under, respectively, the benchmark
interest rate rule, the augmented one and the optimal monetary policy cooperation. Compared with the
benchmark rule, the optimal policy decreases the interest rate on impact in the source country, reverting
it back quickly afterwards. This mitigates slightly the decline in real house prices and limits the substi-
tution effect in favor of residential goods and. The response of output, consumption and investment is
therefore higher in the optimal allocation and the downward pressures on domestic prices are muted.
The optimal policy leads to an exchange rate depreciation on impact followed by an appreciation while
the reverse is true with the benchmark interest rate rule. In the euro area, monetary policy is more re-
strictive in the short-term in the optimal allocation, inducing a negative adjustment for all quantities
and real house prices. The augmented Taylor rule shares qualitatively the features of the optimal policy
concerning the domestic transmission: monetary policy accommodates the productivity shock, limiting
the fallin house prices and supporting domestic demand fornon-residential goods. However, the policy
response to the real house price decline is too strong compared with the optimal allocation, which ends
up being more destabilizing for both prices and quantities. Consequently, the international transmission
under the augmented Taylor rule works through a signiﬁcant exchange rate depreciation of the dollar
which penalizes euro areaoutput but supports its domestic demand for non-residential goods as well as
residential investment. Euro area domestic inﬂation declines and monetary policy decreases slightly the
nominal interest rate. Such a propagation contrasts signiﬁcantly with the optimal one. It seems that the
optimal policy calls - in this particular conﬁguration - for a shift interest rate adjustment, domestically
andabroad,in orderto counteract the strong asymmetric reactions acrosshousehold types and therefore
improving the risk sharing both within and between countries. A deeper analysis of such conjectures
is left for future research. We limit here our assessment on the apparent response of monetary policy to
house price ﬂuctuations which seems to be ampliﬁed in the optimal allocation.
Turning now to the case of LTV shocks, as reported in Figure 16, we observe ﬁrst that the benchmark35
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interest rate rule and the augmented one have, broadly speaking, similar properties, given the moderate
ﬂuctuations in real house prices. Compared to the Taylor rules, the optimal policy strongly increases
interest rate in the source country after a positive LTV shock. Such a policy tightening drives real house
prices and residential investment below baseline in the short-term, which limits the positive effects on
consumption and leads to a small decline in aggregate output. The optimal policy is therefore using
the ﬂexibility of house prices to counteract the relaxation of the collateral constraint coming from the
LTV shock. This induces a substantial appreciation of the nominal exchange rate on impact compared
with the benchmark case. Abroad, the short-term transmission on output is more positive in the optimal
allocation but more pronounced interest rate increases induce a negative response of housing variables
and domestic demand.
Overall, this section shows that, given our structural speciﬁcation of housing market functioning in the
US and the euro area, the historical monetary policy conduct seems consistent with traditional interest
rate feedback rules augmented for real house prices. From a normative perspective, some degree of
monetary policy reaction to ﬂuctuations in the price of residential goods is consistent with the main
features of optimal monetary policy response to housing-related demand shocks. Based on welfare
computations when only housing shocks are allowed, the augmented Taylor rule estimation turns out
to be welfare-improving compared with the benchmark case, in particular for the US economy. Be-
yond this, the optimal allocation suggests that the heterogenous response across households and the
associated welfare losses in terms of imperfect risk sharing should be counteracted, even at the cost
of moderate short term inﬂation volatility. The optimal international transmission of positive housing-
related shocks leads to monetary policy tightening in the foreign country and to a negative adjustment
of housing prices and quantities as well as domestic demand for non-residential goods.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided an original framework to explore the importance of housing markets
and credit frictions for the monetary policy conduct in open economy. We have reproduced some styl-
ized facts for the US and the euro area, and provided a systematic analysis of cross-country business
cycle dynamics. In particular, we have established that while the collateral channel generates signiﬁcant
effects of housing-related shocks on real activity domestically, the international spillovers are relatively
smaller than in the case of shocks affecting the tradable sector. Regarding monetary policy, we have
documented that, from a positive perspective, an accurate historical representation of monetary policy
conduct in the two areas should allow the central bank to respond to housing price movements. More-
over, from a normative standpoint, such a policy conduct is found to be welfare improving. Our results
point to at least two directions. First, a better characterizationof credit frictions may be required in order
to characterize the cross-country propagation of housing shocks, and the related borrowing dynamics.
Second, a deeper analysis of the optimal monetary policy cooperation under housing-related credit fric-
tions may reinforce the preliminary results obtained here. We plan to explore such dimensions in future
work.36
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A Supplementary model description
A.1 The borrower’s program
The impatient agent maximizes (1)u n d e r( 3)a n d( 4) holding with equality25. We report the correspond-
ing ﬁrst order conditions in the next paragraph.
Let us denote
  U X,t = ε
β
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−σC (24)
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The ﬁrst order condition related to non-residential consumption and residential stock are respectively,
  Λt =   U C,t (27)
and
  ΛtTD,t =( 1 − χ)ε
LTV
















1+τC,tΨt are the multipliers associated to constraint (3)a n d( 4), respectively.
Finally, the marginal value of additional borrowing is deﬁned by the following "modiﬁed" version of









The set of optimality conditions is completed by the intratemporal trade-off between consumption and
leisure, which is analyzed in detail later. By rearranging equation (28)i ti sp o s s i b l et od e ﬁ n et h eb o r -
rower’s user cost of residential investment as follows:




















A.2 The saver’s program
Let us denote




25It is possible to show that the collateral constraint always binds in the deterministic steady state, under general conditions.
We assume here that continues to hold in a sufﬁciently small neighborhood of the steady state, so that the model can be solved by
taking a ﬁrst order approximation.39
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The ﬁrst order condition related to non-residential consumption and residential stock are respectively,
Λt = U  C,t (34)
and
ΛtTD,t = U  D,t + γ (1 − δ)Et {Λt+1TD,t+1} (35)
where Λt
1+τC,t is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
Patient households in both countries are allowed to trade in two one-period nominal bonds, a domestic



























where Rt and R∗
t are one-period-ahead nominal interest rates for country H and F respectively.
The previous equations imply an arbitrage condition on bond prices which corresponds to a modiﬁed


























Rearranging equation (35) yields the deﬁnition of the saver’s user cost of residential investment:
RD = TD,t
 








A.3 Labor supply and wage setting






































































































































































t denoting the aggregate real wage in each sector.
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1,t +( 1− ω)H
wj
1,t
ω   H
wj





















A.4 Residential goods sectors
















D (1 − αD − αL)(1−αD−αLAND) (αL)
αL TD,t
(44)
where plt denotes the relative price of land deﬂated by non-residential goods price.














1 − αD − αL
αD
(46)
The ﬁrst order condition associated with the ﬁrm’s choice and the dynamics of residential goods inﬂa-
tion are given by
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BD a t a
US series come from the BEA, the BLS, the Census Bureau and the Federal Reserve Board. In particular,
real house prices in the US are computed using the Census Bureau index (house price index for new
one-family houses sold including value of lot). US household debt is obtained by the Federal Reserve
Board Flow of Funds as a measure of total debt outstanding, held by domestic nonﬁnancial sectors.
Euro area data are taken from Fagan et al (2001) and Eurostat. Concerning the euro area, employment
numbers replace hours. Consequently, as in Smets and Wouters [2005], hours are linked to the number
of people employed e∗













House prices for the euro area are based on national sources and taken from the ECB website26.R e s -
idential investment is taken from Eurostat national accounts and is backcasted using national sources.
Households’ debt for the euro area also comes from the ECB and Eurostat27. The exchange rate is the
euro/dollar exchange rate. Due to statistical problems in computing long series of bilateral current
account and current account for the euro area, we use the US current account as a share of US GDP.
Aggregate real variables are expressed in per capita terms by dividing through with working age pop-
ulation. All the data are detrended before the estimation. Our structural description of the US and euro
area interactions assumes no rest-of-the-world and therefore remains, from a global point of view, a
reduced-form representation. As already mentioned, in order to take into account sources of economic
ﬂuctuations emanating from other countries, we allow ﬁrst for common structural shocks. But we also
introduce a correlation between the home bias preference shock and the euro area public expenditure
shock. Since we use the US total net trade instead of bilateral net trade, we intend to capture, through
this variable, rest-of-the-world shocks that affect the US current account with moderate immediate im-
pact on euro area output. The correlation between the home bias shock and the Euro Area public expen-
ditures shock (ρΔn,G) ,w h i c ha c t sa saG D Pr e s i d u a ls h o c k ,i sm e a nt to control for this drawback. Notice
however that using total US trade instead of bilateral trade broadens the data information on the rest of
the world. Finally, given that, in the ﬁrst order approximation of the model, the UIP shock has a weak
structural interpretation, examining the links with other shocks seems justiﬁed. Consequently, corre-
lations between the UIP shock and other efﬁcient shocks are incorporated in the estimation and may
account for the impact of fundamental shocks on time-varying risk premium. In practice, the bench-
mark model features a correlation between the UIP shocks and the US productivity shocks (ρA,ΔS)a s
well as the government expenditure shocks (ρG,ΔS, ρG∗,ΔS) from both countries. Those correlations
26we applied some statistical interpolation methods to generate quarterly series
27See ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2007, for the description of the data used42
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were also selected according to their signiﬁcance and the improvement brought to the marginal data
density28.
Tab. 1: PARAMETER ESTIMATES 1
Shock names Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs
Distribution Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2
σ
A
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.41
σ
B
t Uniform 3 1.73 1.04 1.08 0.81 1.34
σ
G
t Uniform 3 1.73 3.02 3.08 2.68 3.46
σ
L
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.90 1.09 0.49 1.67
σ
I
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.78 2.06 0.41 4.26
σ
Q
t Uniform 10 5.77 5.71 5.79 2.99 8.56
σ
R
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.18
σ
P
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.27
σ
AD
t Uniform 3 1.73 1.21 1.22 1.05 1.39
σ
LTV
t Uniform 3 1.73 1.11 1.13 0.99 1.26
σ
H
t Uniform 5 2.89 3.56 3.94 2.31 5.49
σ
A∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.50 0.52 0.41 0.63
σ
B∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 2.20 2.27 1.20 3.18
σ
G∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 2.15 2.21 1.85 2.57
σ
L∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.25 0.29 0.15 0.42
σ
I∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.24 0.35 0.12 0.59
σ
Q∗
t Uniform 5 2.89 3.28 3.53 1.92 5.03
σ
R∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.12
σ
P∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.31
σ
AD∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.85 0.85 0.74 0.96
σ
LTV ∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.77 0.78 0.68 0.89
σ
H∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 1.41 1.44 1.12 1.76
σ
ΔS
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.26 0.31 0.15 0.47
σ
Δn
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.50
σ
PF
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.16
σ
PH∗
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.25
F
A
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.22
F
R
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.08
F
CPI
t Uniform 3 1.73 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.17
28The correlation between the home bias shock and EA government expenditures is introduced by adding a term ρΔn,G Δn
t in
the AR(1) of the EA government spending exogenous. The correlations with the UIP shock are introduced by adding terms like
(εA
t )ρA,ΔS in the risk premium exogenous εΔS
t43
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Tab. 2: PARAMETER ESTIMATES 2
Parameter names Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs
Distribution Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2
ρAA Beta 0.5 0.2 0.82 0.62 0.28 0.92
ρRR Beta 0.5 0.2 0.23 0.37 0.06 0.72
ρCCPI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.21 0.26 0.07 0.44
ρA Beta 0.5 0.2 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.93
ρB Beta 0.5 0.2 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.79
ρG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.83 0.82 0.75 0.90
ρL Beta 0.5 0.2 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.23
ρI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.89 0.76 0.56 0.96
ρAD Beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.99
ρLTV Beta 0.5 0.2 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.97
ρH Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.99
ρA∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.95
ρB∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.46 0.46 0.29 0.62
ρG∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.93
ρL∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.22
ρI∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.47 0.50 0.16 0.83
ρA∗
D Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.99
ρLTV ∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.98
ρH∗ Beta 0.5 0.2 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00
ρΔS Beta 0.5 0.2 0.92 0.91 0.85 0.97
ρΔn Beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.97 0.94 1.00
ρI,C Uniform 5 2.89 0.63 0.75 0.32 1.15
ρI∗,C∗ Uniform 5 2.89 0.26 0.29 0.09 0.48
ρG∗,Δn Uniform 7.5 4.33 4.47 4.30 2.87 5.72
ρA,ΔS Normal 0 1 0.02 0.02 -0.22 0.24
ρG,ΔS Normal 0 1 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.09
ρG∗,ΔS Normal 0 1 -0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.0544
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Tab. 3: PARAMETER ESTIMATES 3
Parameter names Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs
Distribution Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2
φ Normal 4 1.5 5.55 5.31 3.31 7.32
ϕ Beta 0.5 0.15 0.78 0.77 0.65 0.90
σC Gamma 1.5 0.375 0.64 0.63 0.50 0.76
h Beta 0.5 0.1 0.58 0.56 0.45 0.68
hB Beta 0.5 0.1 0.31 0.32 0.19 0.45
σLC Gamma 2 0.75 2.55 2.77 1.49 4.10
ξwC Beta 0.75 0.05 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.86
ξwD Beta 0.75 0.05 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.88
γwC Beta 0.5 0.15 0.42 0.44 0.22 0.66
γwD Beta 0.5 0.15 0.59 0.56 0.32 0.81
ξp Beta 0.75 0.05 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.92
γp Beta 0.5 0.15 0.55 0.54 0.38 0.70
φ
∗ Normal 4 1.5 2.47 2.60 1.44 3.71
ϕ
∗ Beta 0.5 0.15 0.89 0.87 0.78 0.95
σ
∗
C Gamma 1.5 0.375 1.06 1.10 0.94 1.24
h
∗ Beta 0.5 0.1 0.83 0.77 0.63 0.90
h
∗
B Beta 0.5 0.1 0.28 0.30 0.19 0.41
σ
∗
LC Gamma 2 0.75 1.53 1.69 0.92 2.40
ξ
∗
wC Beta 0.75 0.05 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.84
ξ
∗
wD Beta 0.75 0.05 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.86
γw∗
C Beta 0.5 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.12 0.44
γw∗
D Beta 0.5 0.15 0.44 0.47 0.22 0.70
ξ
∗
p Beta 0.75 0.05 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.94
γ
∗
p Beta 0.5 0.15 0.51 0.51 0.38 0.64
λe Beta 0.75 0.05 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.82
ρ Beta 0.75 0.1 0.79 0.79 0.74 0.83
rπ Normal 1.5 0.25 1.78 1.79 1.49 2.07
rΔπ Gamma 0.3 0.1 0.26 0.26 0.18 0.34
rY Gamma 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.15
rΔY Gamma 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.24
ρ
∗ Beta 0.75 0.1 0.84 0.83 0.78 0.88
r
∗
π Normal 1.5 0.25 0.84 0.90 0.69 1.12
r
∗
Δπ Gamma 0.3 0.1 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.22
r
∗
Y Gamma 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.23
r
∗
ΔY Gamma 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.20
ξ Uniform 3 1.7321 1.27 1.55 0.92 2.18
n Uniform 0.5 0.2887 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
η Beta 0.5 0.28 0.98 0.90 0.80 1.00
η
∗ Beta 0.5 0.28 0.86 0.80 0.62 1.00
χ Normal 1 0.25 0.83 0.89 0.49 1.28
χΔS Uniform 0.5 0.2887 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.29
ω Beta 0.35 0.05 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.29
ω
∗ Beta 0.35 0.05 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.2445
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Tab. 4: PARAMETER ESTIMATES COMPARISON
Parameters High borrowers’ share Augmented Taylor Rule
Mode I1 I2 Mode I1 I2
φ 4.70 2.50 6.46 5.11 3.38 7.08
ϕ 0.77 0.66 0.88 0.83 0.73 0.92
σC 0.67 0.54 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.86
h 0.49 0.36 0.63 0.59 0.46 0.69
hB 0.38 0.25 0.51 0.36 0.23 0.53
σLC 2.09 1.12 3.49 1.68 0.92 2.95
ξwC 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.80 0.76 0.84
ξwD 0.84 0.79 0.88 0.84 0.78 0.87
γwC 0.46 0.25 0.72 0.42 0.22 0.70
γwD 0.60 0.37 0.83 0.63 0.35 0.82
ξp 0.89 0.85 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.91
γp 0.51 0.35 0.68 0.49 0.34 0.66
φ
∗ 1.69 0.78 3.22 4.34 3.15 6.33
ϕ
∗ 0.84 0.74 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.97
σ
∗
C 0.99 0.57 1.20 0.79 0.68 0.96
h
∗ 0.37 0.21 0.68 0.82 0.73 0.89
h
∗
B 0.31 0.19 0.44 0.35 0.21 0.49
σ
∗
LC 1.54 0.88 2.80 1.52 0.93 2.58
ξ
∗
wC 0.81 0.78 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.84
ξ
∗
wD 0.82 0.77 0.86 0.82 0.77 0.86
γ
∗
wC 0.36 0.18 0.55 0.27 0.12 0.43
γ
∗
wD 0.48 0.23 0.72 0.40 0.21 0.68
ξ
∗
p 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.93
γ
∗
p 0.49 0.35 0.60 0.59 0.46 0.73
λe 0.79 0.75 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.83
ρ 0.78 0.74 0.83 0.79 0.73 0.83
rπ 1.90 1.62 2.20 1.86 1.54 2.20
rΔπ 0.29 0.20 0.38 0.28 0.19 0.37
rY 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.14
rΔY 0.20 0.15 0.26 0.14 0.10 0.19
ρ
∗ 0.86 0.81 0.91 0.88 0.83 0.91
r
∗
π 1.39 0.84 1.84 1.47 1.15 1.85
r
∗
Δπ 0.19 0.13 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.27
r
∗
Y 0.18 0.12 0.27 0.06 0.03 0.11
r
∗
ΔY 0.25 0.18 0.33 0.16 0.12 0.20
rΔTD 0.10 0.07 0.14
r
∗
ΔTD 0.17 0.13 0.23
ξ 1.47 0.96 2.20 1.08 0.85 1.62
n 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
η 0.98 0.82 1.00 0.97 0.78 1.00
η
∗ 0.78 0.63 1.00 0.76 0.58 0.98
χ 0.96 0.48 1.33 0.85 0.42 1.25
χΔS 0.19 0.12 0.26 0.19 0.12 0.29
ω 0.46 0.40 0.51 0.22 0.18 0.28
ω
∗ 0.42 0.37 0.48 0.19 0.15 0.2446
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Tab. 5: COMPARISON OF SECOND-ORDER MOMENTS
DETRENDED HP FILTERED
data Baseline High Borr. Aug. Taylor data Baseline High Borr. Aug. Taylor
Standard deviation
US
Zt 2.14 1.91 1.99 2.03 1.25 1.18 1.27 1.30
Ct 1.90 1.76 1.93 1.76 0.84 1.07 1.28 1.11
It 6.11 5.03 5.45 5.52 3.78 2.62 2.89 3.01
ZDt 11.21 9.17 9.18 8.43 6.51 5.22 5.27 4.99
TDt 4.87 4.32 4.12 3.48 1.34 2.19 2.13 1.92
Πt 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.26 0.26 0.25




t 1.67 1.15 1.48 2.17 0.88 0.84 0.93 1.19
C
∗
t 1.76 1.16 1.66 1.82 0.83 0.74 1.05 0.96
I
∗
t 5.47 3.16 3.86 5.56 2.75 2.13 2.31 2.93
Z
∗
Dt 3.34 6.12 6.47 5.60 1.90 3.28 3.30 3.20
T
∗
Dt 6.24 3.17 3.17 2.78 1.88 1.55 1.51 1.33
Π
∗
t 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.40 0.21 0.29 0.28 0.32
R
∗
t 0.37 0.27 0.30 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.16
ΔSt 4.80 5.75 5.02 5.24 4.39 5.41 4.74 4.98
CAt 1.28 0.66 0.70 0.78 0.46 0.39 0.42 0.44
Correlations
Zt, Ct 0.80 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.84 0.69 0.72 0.73
Zt, It 0.64 0.72 0.67 0.74 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.72
Zt, ZDt 0.52 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.62 0.08 0.08 -0.01
TDt, Ct 0.12 0.30 0.31 0.10 0.47 0.32 0.43 0.02
ZDt, TDt 0.25 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.49 0.50 0.45






























t 0.34 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 0.20 -0.02 0.05 0.01
Zt, Z
∗
t 0.22 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.27 0.13 0.17 0.16
Ct, C
∗
t -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.08
ZDt, Z
∗
Dt -0.47 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.03
TDt, T
∗
Dt 0.15 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.07
ΔSt, CAt -0.23 -0.34 -0.24 -0.28 -0.15 -0.34 -0.22 -0.22
C
rel
t , RERt -0.29 -0.21 -0.34 -0.25 -0.21 -0.26 -0.33 -0.1647
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Tab. 6: SHOCKS DECOMPOSITION OF UNCONDITIONAL VARIANCES









Zt 0.34 0.39 2.45 87.61 9.21
Ct 1.32 1.30 2.99 74.60 19.79
ZDt 57.65 0.04 31.93 9.98 0.40
TDt 7.87 0.08 80.11 9.37 2.57
Πt 0.15 0.01 0.02 66.21 33.61
Rt 0.09 0.48 2.11 87.53 9.79




t 0.09 0.25 4.79 84.97 9.90
C
∗
t 0.68 0.92 4.54 71.47 22.39
Z
∗
Dt 59.51 0.04 34.36 5.62 0.47
T
∗
Dt 5.62 0.08 85.36 5.37 3.57
Π
∗
t 0.03 0.01 3.42 56.89 39.65
R
∗
t 0.05 0.14 8.97 75.13 15.71
B
∗
t 1.97 31.16 42.92 23.18 0.77
ΔSt 0.01 0.00 0.57 17.60 81.82
CAt 0.00 0.01 0.84 11.24 87.9148
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Tab. 7: SHOCKS DECOMPOSITION OF UNCONDITIONAL VARIANCES: VARYING THE SHARE OF BORROW-
ERS.
No Borrowers High Borrowers’ share
Domestic Other Non Domestic Other Non
housing Domestic Domestic housing Domestic Domestic
US
Zt 1.35 89.85 8.80 9.76 80.90 9.34
Ct 0.94 78.62 20.44 22.65 61.25 16.10
ZDt 89.74 9.83 0.43 89.47 10.13 0.40
TDt 87.42 9.68 2.90 88.70 9.07 2.23
Πt 0.20 65.22 34.58 0.26 67.38 32.36
Rt 0.59 89.16 10.25 10.21 80.92 8.87




t 4.37 84.61 11.02 9.44 82.41 8.15
C
∗
t 0.63 73.95 25.42 16.91 69.90 13.19
Z
∗
Dt 94.04 5.54 0.42 93.54 5.95 0.51
T
∗
Dt 91.01 5.50 3.49 91.16 5.31 3.53
Π
∗
t 5.40 54.02 40.58 2.52 60.61 36.87
R
∗
t 13.77 68.58 17.65 8.38 79.64 11.98
B
∗
t --- 76.95 22.25 0.80
ΔSt 0.72 17.35 81.93 0.65 18.33 81.02
CAt 1.23 10.23 88.54 0.80 13.19 86.0149
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Fig. 1: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  R
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).50
ECB





















































































































































































































































































Fig. 2: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  L
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).51
ECB


















































































































































































































































































































Fig. 3: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  G
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).52
ECB





































































































































































































































































































Fig. 4: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  ΔS
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).53
ECB



































































































































































































































































































Fig. 5: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  D
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).54
ECB














































































































































































































































































































Fig. 6: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  D∗
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).55
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Fig. 7: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  
AD
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).56
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Fig. 8: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  
AD∗
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).57
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Fig. 9: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  LTV
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).58
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Fig. 10: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  LTV ∗
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high borrowers (dotted lines with circle), model with no borrowers (dashed lines with cross).59
ECB
























































































































































































































Fig. 11: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  D
t . Optimal cooperation (plain lines), Benchmark
Estimated Rules (dotted and circle lines), Augmented Estimated Rules (dashed and cross lines).60
ECB


































































































































































































































Fig. 12: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  D∗
t . Optimal cooperation (plain lines), Benchmark
Estimated Rules (dotted and circle lines), Augmented Estimated Rules (dashed and cross lines).61
ECB

































































































































































































































Fig. 13: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  D
t . No borrower case. Optimal cooperation
(plain lines), Benchmark Estimated Rules (dotted and circle lines), Augmented Estimated Rules (dashed and cross lines).62
ECB
































































































































































































































Fig. 14: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  D∗
t . No borrower case. Optimal cooperation
(plain lines), Benchmark Estimated Rules (dotted and circle lines), Augmented Estimated Rules (dashed and cross lines).63
ECB



































































































































































































































Fig. 15: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  
AD
t . Optimal cooperation (plain lines), Benchmark
Estimated Rules (dotted and circle lines), Augmented Estimated Rules (dashed and cross lines).64
ECB

































































































































































































Fig. 16: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on  LTV
t . Optimal cooperation (plain lines), Bench-
mark Estimated Rules (dotted and circle lines), Augmented Estimated Rules (dashed and cross lines).65
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